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So, here we are, we’ve just about reached the end of our series on this conflict, we’ve covered the history, the narratives, the context surrounding the Neo-Nazis and the far right extremists, but before we close out there’s something you still probably want to know, how does this war actually end?
First, let’s talk about the situation on the ground, in our first episode we explained that there had been several key points where major territorial gains were made, Russia’s initial invasion, then Ukraine’s Kyiv and Kharkiv counteroffensives, all in 2022, but that for 2023 the war had been stagnant, with the conflict devolving into brutal attritional warfare.
In 2024 that trend has continued, in the last months of the year Russia has been on the offensive, pushing ahead in Donbas and retaking small pockets of Kharkiv, but their progress has been extremely slow and costly.
To try and stall this advance the Ukrainians launched an offensive into Russia in August, crossing the border into Russia’s Kursk region and occupying a small pocket of territory there, the idea behind this was to use the occupied territory as leverage in future negotiations and force the Kremlin to divert forces away from their offensives into Ukraine, this turned out to be counterproductive for the Ukrainians as Russia chose not to prioritise retaking Kursk.
An offensive that was meant to tie down Russia instead tied down Ukraine, leaving large numbers of Ukrainian troops that could’ve been taking part in the defence of their country stuck holding a small scrap of Russian land they had no intention of holding in the long term, although the offensive had some propaganda value, showing that Russia’s borders were unstable and that the war in Ukraine was making the country less secure not more, it was ultimately a strategic disaster.
With the continuing stalemate on the frontlines the focus for resolving the war has moved to the diplomatic front, to Russia peace means Ukraine recognising the Russian annexation of the 5 disputed regions (Crimea, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Donbas) and agreeing to military neutrality, to Ukraine peace means regaining all of those regions and joining NATO, when they each talk about peace they talk about completely opposing ideas of peace that the other would never accept.
As we mentioned in Episode 1’s conclusion both Russia and Ukraine were holding firm, hoping for a “curveball” event that could break the deadlock and turn things towards their favour. The Russians were hoping for Western commitment to break, cutting the lifeline of foreign military aid that keeps Ukraine’s war machine going, the Ukrainians were hoping for another Prigozhin moment, where Russian internal discontent could collapse the Kremlin from inside.
After nearly 3 years of the invasion and 11 years of the Russo-Ukrainian War in total, we have our curveball, the US election.
In that election US President Joe Biden dropped out as a candidate after a disastrous debate performance and fears around his age impacting his ability to do the job, and his replacement, Vice President Kamala Harris, failed in her attempt to keep the Democratic Party in power. Donald Trump is now President-Elect of the United States.
Biden and Harris were committed to opposing Russia, Trump is not, he has a reputation for softness surrounding Russia and has openly said he would’ve allowed Russia to take Ukrainian territory in exchange for a peace deal, his party the Republican Party have frequently criticised what they call “blank cheques” being written to Ukraine. Although the Ukrainians have never gotten as much as they wanted, the overall trend over the past few years is that they’ve been able to pressure Western countries into giving more and more aid, pushing the boundaries on what weapons and equipment can be sent, and cutting the strings attached to using them, under Trump that trend won’t just stop, it will rapidly reverse.
Trump’s ambition is to be a decisive peacemaker and we have an idea of what his peace looks like, a frozen conflict, the war stops along the present battle lines and the remainder of Ukraine stays neutral, at least in military terms, so no NATO membership, it’s a settlement much closer to Russia’s ambitions than Ukraine’s.
In order to convince the Ukrainians to accept it Trump’s government plans to use US military aid as leverage, that aid makes up almost all of the military support Ukraine has been receiving from the West, without that aid Ukraine will struggle to find the capacity to carry out offensives or even maintain many of their current lines, it’s the aid that keeps their military on a level competitive with Russia’s, so while they might not face an immediate rout, especially since the Biden administration is trying to buy time by sending huge quantities of aid and loosening the rules on how it can be used before they hand power to Trump, the Ukrainian leadership will have to very quickly face up to a stark choice, a peace involving major concessions or a slow collapse.
Given that Zelensky has already begun publicly referencing the prospect of giving up Ukraine’s lost territories, a rapid shift from his long held position that nothing will be bargained for last referenced only a few months ago, it seems he’s already reckoned with his choice.
Some have tried to avoid this fork in the road by suggesting that the rest of the Western alliance could pick up where the US leaves off, but this idea doesn’t survive contact with reality, although most of Europe’s leadership has maintained their sympathy for Ukraine, they haven’t prepared for the prospect of having to shoulder her burden alone without the intense might of the US military industrial complex on their side, that means Europe’s ability to pick up the tab and deprive Trump of his leverage is minimal at best, nonexistent at worst.
Expecting European nations to suddenly rapidly increase aid by around ¾ is no small feat, it would involve massive tax rises, cuts to spending elsewhere or both, at a time when many are already struggling with the cost of living, that’s a much less intense struggle than living in fear of occupation, artillery or a missile landing on your house, but that kind of adversity in pursuit of a very far away victory would be hard for voters to stomach.
But more importantly, even if it could be funded, Europe doesn’t have the kind of military industrial complex that the US has, most of the US aid money has gone into its own domestic military industry, paying local companies to produce weapons and equipment that are then shipped to the Ukrainian front lines, Western European nations like the UK and those in the EU don’t have the same capacity to do this.
Zelensky’s hopes of achieving his maximalist aims relied on long term support, Ukraine could potentially have won the game of attrition against Russia had the West been willing to support it for a decade or two. Maybe, just like Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russia could’ve been bled dry over time, its morale drained, and eventually made to withdraw, but with the change in Washington the door to that outcome has closed.
The exact specifics of any deal are still up in the air, Trump is known to be highly erratic when it comes to his foreign policy, in his first term one moment he was threatening to send North Korea into fire and fury and the next he was shaking hands with Kim Jong Un and promising to bring the North out of its isolation, in Syria one moment he was aiding the Kurds and the next he was selling them out to the Turks, Trump’s wildcard nature means the details of what happens are still very open to debate, but what is clear is that the incoming US leadership will be softer on Russia and harder on Ukraine.